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ABSTRACT
In this position paper for the 2019 CSCW workshop Good
Systems: Ethical AI for CSCW I propose one tool and one
idea for navigating the complex ethical problem space that
results from the interaction of human and/or AI agents in
shared, hopefully cooperative, computing environments.
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AGENT-AGENT INTERACTION
The  introduction  of non-human  agents  (e.g.,  AI-powered
virtual assistants like Apple's Siri), which are increasingly
indistinguishable  from  human  agents,  to  everyday
computing  raises  many  questions  about  what  AI,  our
interactions with it, and AI-AI interactions (all collectively:
agent-agent  interactions)  could  and  should  be  like,
especially as AI grow in capacity to be moral agents akin to
humans  (Floridi  &  Sanders,  2004).  To  guide
implementations  and  expectations  of  moral  AI  requires
considering  the  many  ways  agents’  actions  can  be
undesirable,  but  presently most  news  media  and  even
scholarly discourses focus narrowly on poor performance,
transgressions  of  the  law,  and  negative  outcomes  for
particular  individuals irrespective  of  their socio-economic
group or status (Stahl et al.,  2016). Thus, while the moral-
problem space of agent-agent interaction is arguably more
vast  than  that  of  human-human interaction,  we designers
and critics have so far used fewer tools to analyse it.
Towards addressing narrow thinking in AI ethics, and to aid
anticipatory (rather than reactionary) policy, I would like to
consider the use of a  multi-moral matrix  for assessing (in
design or post hoc) particular AI cases along multiple moral
frameworks.  Figure 1 shows an example matrix with agent
actions  in  the  leftmost  column  and  each  other  column
showing possible transgressions according to various moral
frameworks  (summarised  to  the  point  of  caricature),
including (left to right): legalism, consequentialism, virtue
ethics  and  deontology,  social  justice,  and  social
contractualism.  Cells  at  the  intersections  of  actions  and
frameworks  may  reflect  only  that  there  are  possible
transgressions or  may contain more  detail.  Agent  actions
may be  relatively  easy  to  populate,  e.g.,  by   identifying
actions in user stories during development.
A
ction
Illegal
B
ad
 ou
tcom
e
Ill-in
ten
tion
ed
,
d
ecep
tive,
n
eglectfd
u
l
S
ocially u
n
ju
st
V
iolates a social
con
tract
...
1 X X
2 X
...
Figure 1. Partial example of a multi-moral matrix for
analysing ethical issues in agent-agent interaction.
The example matrix includes only a few moral frameworks
and is meant to be neither exhaustive nor prescriptive; any
use of such a matrix requires customisation according to the
expectations of, e.g., the relevant sectors and cultures.
Finally, I suggest to adopt or adapt into thinking about AI
ethics an idea that appears thematically appropriate and also
promising  for  addressing  cultural  moral  differences  like
those just mentioned (Hongladarom, 2008): the concept of
ontic  trust (Floridi,  2009).  Put  briefly,  ontic  trust  is  a
responsibility  to  care  for  the  intrinsically  valuable
information  objects  that  populate  our  world/infosphere;
shorter  still,  causing  entropy  in  a  shared  information
environment  is  unethical.  Such  an  idea  shows  us  a  less
obvious way agent-agent interactions can be bad (i.e.,  by
causing entropy – it could thus go in the above matrix), but
arguably also implies rights for non-human agents (i.e., AI).
Surprisingly,  little  has  been  said  about  ontic  trust  in  AI
ethics discourse (and to my knowledge, nothing has been
said in the context of CSCW). It may therefore be useful to
raise the idea at the workshop and discuss questions like: 
• Is  an  imperative  to  care  for  information  objects
equivalent to an imperative to prevent entropy?
• What do such imperatives imply entail for privacy,
data logging, the right to be forgotten, and CSCW
community values? (Bruckman et al., 2017)
• Can  ontic  trust  aid  universal  design  by,  for
example, mediating disparate cultural views about
ethical AI?
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